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Abstract 
Expert disputes can present laypeople with several challenges including trying to understand why 
such disputes occur. In an online survey of the U.S. public, we used a psychometric approach to 
elicit perceptions of expert disputes for 56 forecasts sampled from seven domains (climate 
change, crime, economics, environment, health, politics, terrorism). People with low education, 
or with low self-reported knowledge of the topic, were most likely to attribute expert disputes to 
expert incompetence. People with higher self-reported knowledge tended to attribute disputes to 
expert bias due to financial or ideological reasons. The more highly educated and cognitively 
able were most likely to attribute disputes to natural factors, such as the irreducible complexity 
and randomness of the phenomenon. We highlight several important implications of these results 
for scientists and risk managers and argue for further research on how people perceive and 
grapple with expert disputes. 
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Public perceptions of expert disagreement: 
Bias and incompetence or a complex and random world? 
Expert disputes are common within many scientific domains. This is particularly true of 
expert forecasts regarding health, environmental, economic, and socio-political topics. Although 
experts may perceive these disagreements to be part of the normal scientific process, members of 
the lay public are likely to draw quite different inferences, particularly if scientific authority 
stems in part from its perceived consensus among experts (Collingridge & Reeve, 1986). It is 
important that we understand public reactions to publicized expert disputes to design better 
communication strategies among scientists and laypeople, to select appropriate risk management 
responses (Hoffman, Fischbeck, Krupnick, & McWilliams, 2007), and to more fully predict the 
relationship between scientific authority and perceptions of uncertainty in the public domain 
(e.g., Stilgoe, 2007). In this paper, we use a psychometric approach to examine public 
perceptions of expert disagreement across a diverse sample of forecasting topics.   
Why do experts disagree? 
Einhorn (1974) viewed consensus as a necessary feature of expertise itself.  If several so-
called experts present sharply conflicting forecasts on a topic this would be grounds for doubting 
whether they are experts at all. Expert disagreement from this traditional perspective is the result 
of incompetence (i.e., they are not experts) or either intentional or unintentional bias due to 
ideology, worldviews, or private interests (Hammond, 1996).  However, there have been several 
alternative views of expert disagreement that focus on contributing structural and functional 
factors (Shanteau, 2000) and the fundamental limits of human judgment (Mumpower & Stewart, 
1996). Shanteau (2000) argued that expert disagreement should be expected due to the ill-
structured, complex, dynamic, uncertain, and evolving nature of real-world problems.  
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Scientists often report that they expect to disagree with each other and see this as a means 
by which important gaps in knowledge are identified. In this sense, disagreement is a part of the 
normal scientific process and it is expected that different experts will think about a problem 
differently, particularly problems that are complex and involve scientific uncertainty 
(Mumpower & Stewart, 1996). For instance, experts may have fundamental disagreements about 
the causes of phenomenona, the analytic methods that should be used, and the interpretation of 
existing empirical data. A study of expert views on foodborne illness in the United States, for 
example, distinguished between situations in which experts are highly confident in their own best 
estimates but disagree with each other and situations in which experts disagree with each other 
but also are uncertain about their own estimates (a not uncommon situation that decision makers 
would find especially problematic; Hoffman et al, 2007). From this perspective, disagreements 
may be considered to be completely natural among even the most competent and unbiased 
experts.  Yet this general tolerance for disagreement may not be shared, at least to the same 
degree, among members of the public.  And to the extent that disagreements are due to factors 
not related to science (e.g., bias or personal profit), scientists also may take a dim view of 
disputes.  
Public perceptions of why experts disagree 
The lay public is at a disadvantage in making sense of expert disputes.  In many cases, 
they are only presented with public communications and have virtually no way of knowing the 
actual causes or magnitude of expert disagreements (Collins & Evans, 2007). However, just 
because the public does not have insider information does not mean that they will withhold 
judgment when confronted with conflicting expert predictions. Table 1 lists several different 
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causal inferences that members of the lay public may make when encountering expert 
disagreements. 
Inferences 1–3 describe different fundamental sources of uncertainty.  Complexity and 
randomness map onto what Hacking (1975) calls aleatory uncertainty, which describes 
irreducible uncertainty that is a feature of the world itself. Laypeople making these inferences 
regard the nature of the world as the primary problem and not the ability, competence or honesty 
of the experts. The third inference (experts lack knowledge) maps roughly to the concept of 
epistemic uncertainty, which is due to incomplete knowledge about phenomena that is 
theoretically attainable (Hacking, 1975). Thus, epistemic uncertainty can be reduced (e.g., 
through the scientific process) while aleatory uncertainty cannot. Inferences 4-6 are focused on 
the characteristics or actions of the experts.  Inferring expert incompetence and/or bias from 
disagreements constitutes the traditional view discussed above. Laypeople may also infer that 
apparent expert disagreement is artificially magnified due to experts being unwilling to admit 
uncertainty (inference #6). Since this relates to how forecast are communicated, this inference 
could be classified as a type of linguistic uncertainty (Regan, Colyvan & Burman, 2002).   
Outside of a few specific contexts, there have been surprisingly few empirical 
investigations of public perceptions of the causes of expert disagreements. Johnson and Slovic 
(1998) interviewed members of the U.S. public and asked for reactions after the presentation of a 
range of risk estimates for an environmental carcinogen. Participants most often responded that 
the expert disagreement was due to self-interest or expert incompetence. In another study, a U.S. 
sample read a statement about expert disagreement (e.g., “Often experts disagree over the size of 
an industrial health or safety risk”) and were asked about the causes of such disputes. Fifty-five 
percent of the sample selected all of the choices available (expert incompetence, self-interest, 
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and lack of scientific knowledge), with 18% choosing self-interest, and 14% choosing lack of 
scientific knowledge (Johnson, 2003). In a Finnish interview study on food additives, experts 
were deemed to disagree due to, in descending order, general difficulty in obtaining scientific 
knowledge, self-interest, and competence and knowledge differences across experts (Kajanne & 
Pirttilä-Backman, 1999). There was also a moderating effect of education, with less educated 
participants favoring the difficulty-in-obtaining-scientific-knowledge explanation and the more 
educated favoring the self-interest explanation.  
These results are insightful concerning some of the reasons for the range of public 
perceptions of disputes but are mainly drawn from interviews and are limited to specific 
examples of expert disagreement concerning health and safety risks. In the present study, we 
focus on expert forecasts across a range of domains and examine other possible causal inferences 
from expert disagreements as well as several additional moderators of these perceptions.     
Individual differences and public perceptions of expert disagreement 
Perceptions of expert disagreements may also be moderated by the skills and knowledge 
of the individual evaluating the dispute. For instance, individuals with more education and 
greater cognitive resources likely have richer mental models about the normal process of science 
(Rabinovich & Morton, 2012) and the limitations of scientific knowledge and forecasting. Thus, 
we might expect that this subgroup of the public would be more likely to attribute expert 
disagreement to the fundamental challenges of making predictions in complex, real-world 
systems. However, the qualitative results of Kajanne & Pirttilä-Backman (1999), discussed 
above, provide evidence against this prediction in that it was the less educated that favored the 
lack-of-scientific-knowledge explanation and the more educated that favored the expert self-
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interest explanation. In this present study, we will examine this moderator hypothesis again in a 
quantitative fashion using a robust measure of cognitive ability. 
A second potential moderator is the familiarity with or knowledge about the domain. As 
above, we may expect that individuals who have more insight into how science and forecasting is 
conducted in a particular domain may be more likely to blame the world (complexity, 
randomness) and less likely to blame the expert (incompetence and/or bias). Members of the 
public with less knowledge about a domain may tend to attribute expert disagreement to the 
more traditional causes of incompetence and bias.            
The present study 
We used a psychometric survey approach to examine public perceptions of a range of 
forecast topics spanning seven broad domains. The psychometric approach has been used to 
great effect in several studies focused on public perceptions of hazards (Slovic, 1987). We tested 
the extent to which the lay public attributes expert disagreement to natural (aleatory) causes 
(irreducible complexity and randomness), expert (epistemic) causes (lack of knowledge, expert 
incompetence, expert bias) or to communication failures (expert unwillingness to admit 
uncertainty). We also stratified our sample to examine perceptions of subgroups of individuals 
based on cognitive ability/education and self-reported knowledge about the forecasting domain 
under study. The results from this study will expand our understanding of public reactions to 
expert disputes and provide insights into how scientific results and forecasts can be better 
communicated to different subgroups of the public.           
Methods 
Sample. Participants were randomly drawn from the Decision Research web panel subject 
pool. Forty participants completed the study in less than 10 minutes and were removed leaving N 
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= 342 (57% female). The mean age of the sample was 45 years (range = 22–76 yrs). 
Approximately 26% had a high school education or less, 31% attended some college or 
vocational school, 27% were college graduates, and 16% had advanced degrees. 
Design and measures. Forecast topics. We generated 56 forecast/prediction topics that 
lay people might encounter in newspapers, online, or on television (see Appendix A). The 
forecast topics were derived from seven different domains (Health, Politics, Terrorism, Climate 
Change, Economics, Crime, & Environment) with eight forecast topics per domain. Within each 
domain, there were four binary topics (will event happen or not?) and four continuous topics 
(prediction of continuous quantity—e.g., gross domestic product).  We also varied the time 
horizon of the forecast topics at four levels: Short (6 months), Medium (5 years), Long (15 
years), and Very long (50 years). The goal of this design aspect was to have a roughly equal mix 
of time horizons across the domains.  There were no significant effects of forecast type (binary 
or continuous) or time horizon on participant ratings and we do not discuss these manipulations 
further. In this study, we focused on general societal level forecasts (as opposed to personal 
forecasts in medicine or finance, for example) and did not include “hard” science domains like 
physics or astronomy.  Results from our studies using these latter types of topics will be reported 
in future papers.     
Procedure. The study was conducted online. Participants were first presented with a 
general introduction: “In this study, we are interested in your perceptions of different kinds of 
forecasts or predictions that are made by experts in a given field. You may encounter these types 
of forecasts on television, in newspaper articles or other written materials, or online.” Each 
participant was then presented with seven different forecast topics, one pseudo-randomly drawn 
from each of the seven domains. The order of the seven selected forecasts was also randomized. 
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Participants made each rating on all seven forecast topics before moving on to the next question. 
This procedure resulted in approximately n = 40 participants providing all ratings for each of the 
56 forecast topics.   
Measures. Participants rated each forecast topic on seven different constructs (see 
Appendix B): Expert disagreement (three items), Complexity (one item), Irreducible 
Randomness (one item), Expert knowledge (two items), Expert credibility/competence (two 
items), Expert bias (affected by private interests or personal ideology; two items), and Expert 
willingness to admit uncertainty or lack of knowledge (two items). They also indicated their 
level of general knowledge in the domain for each of the forecasts they rated.  
In an earlier study session, participants completed an eight-item numeracy measure 
(Weller et al., 2013) and two fluid reasoning tests (Dieckmann et al., 2014). These fluid 
reasoning tests were modeled after the number and letter series completion tasks commonly used 
in IQ tests. The number series test had eight items (ex. What number comes in the blank: 2, 3, 5, 
7, 11, 13, _______) and the letter series test had seven items of increasing difficulty (ex. What 
letter comes in the blank: A, E, I, M, Q, U, _______).  
Analytic approach. For each of the 56 forecasts, we calculated the mean rating on each of 
the seven model constructs across all of the participants that rated each forecast. The analysis 
was focused at the level of these mean forecast ratings (N = 56). We used multiple linear 
regression to identify which of the six predictors (randomness, complexity, expert knowledge, 
credibility/competence, bias, admit uncertainty) were most strongly related to ratings of expert 
disagreement across the set of forecasts. One inherent difficulty of this approach is deciding 
which predictors should remain in a given model and which should be removed as relatively 
unimportant. The traditional solution to this problem is to use forward or backward step-wise 
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model selection. Problems with these approaches include the reliance on arbitrary thresholds for 
p-values and that backward and forward step-wise methods will not always result in the same 
final model (Venables & Ripley, 1997). Alternative approaches, not based on p-values, use 
information criterion (IC) as measures of support for a given model. For instance, all possible 
models from a given set of predictors can be fit and ranked by their relative support (IC).  In 
addition, this approach of fitting all possible models allows for multi-model inference as opposed 
to just focusing on the single “best” model.  This approach also allows the assessment of 
predictor importance across all possible models (Buckland, Burnham, & Augustin, 1997).        
Model tests were conducted with an automated model selection and multi-model 
inference approach implemented in the glmulti package for the R statistical computing 
environment (R Development Core Team, 2013; Calgano & Mazancourt, 2010). The Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) was used to assess fit and compare alternative models, where 
smaller BICs indicate superior fit after accounting for sample size and model complexity 
(Raftery, 1995). All possible explanatory models were fit and the “best” model was determined 
by the smallest BIC.1 The relative support of this “best” model was then compared to the other 
plausible models. Raftery (1995) reports the following rules of thumb for comparing models with 
respect to the BIC: Weak evidence = BIC diff 0–2; Positive evidence = BIC diff 2–6; Strong 
evidence = BIC diff 6–10; Very strong evidence = BIC diff > 10. Thus, any model that has less 
than a two unit BIC difference as compared to the best model (approximately) should be 
considered plausible. We also assessed predictor importance in a multi-model fashion by 
examining the importance (or support) for each predictor averaged across all possible models 
(for details see Calgano & Mazancourt, 2010).     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We report the results for all possible models that do not include any multiplicative (or interaction) effects. 
Additional analyses were conducting allowing multiplicative effects but none of the multiplicative terms received 
strong support.  Thus, we report the results that do not include such terms for simplicity.  
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The analyses above were conducted for the full sample as well as stratified by cognitive 
ability and self-reported knowledge in the forecast domain. A median split was used to separate 
participants higher and lower in cognitive ability. Mean ratings on each construct for each 
forecast were then created separately for each group. Self-reported knowledge in the forecast 
domain was rated by each participant separately for each forecast presented. Again, a median 
split was used to separate the mean level forecast data for people who self-reported very little to 
little knowledge (rating of two or less on the five-point scale) and those who reported some to a 
lot of knowledge about a forecast domain (rating of three or higher on five-point scale).  
Results 
Psychometrics. Ratings on the three expert disagreement items were strongly correlated 
across forecast topics in all seven domains (αs = .67–.77) and were averaged to create a single 
expert disagreement score. The expert knowledge (rs = .56–.67), expert credibility/competence 
(rs = .59–.77), bias (rs = .30–.43), and willingness to admit uncertainty or lack of knowledge (rs 
= .56–.64) items were all moderately to strongly correlated across forecast topics in all seven 
domains and were averaged to create single construct scores.     
The numeracy, number completion, and letter completion tasks all showed acceptable 
reliability (Kuder-Richardson αs = .70, .80, .68, respectively). The average inter-scale correlation 
between numeracy, number completion and letter completion was r = .65 (range .58–.68).  
Treating each of the scales as an item of a single cognitive ability construct resulted in acceptable 
internal consistency (α = .84; scale range 0–23). Scores from these three scales were summed to 
create a broad cognitive ability scale.  
Moderator characteristics. As expected, there was a significant linear relation between 
level of education and cognitive ability scores (HS or less M = 9.05; some college M = 10.69; 
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College M = 12.04; Graduate degree M = 14.16; F(3, 330) = 12.23, p < .001). We examined 
whether there was a relation between cognitive ability and self-report ratings of knowledge in the 
domain for the participants that rated each forecast.  Cognitive ability was not significantly 
related to ratings of self-reported knowledge in any of the seven forecast domains, suggesting 
that examining these moderators separately may result in unique information about the 
perceptions of these different subpopulations.     
Predictors of perceived expert disagreement. Analyzing the mean level ratings from the 
full sample resulted in 13 different candidate models within 0.2–2 BIC units from each other. 
Thus, we had weak evidence for the superiority of any given model and there was a high amount 
of uncertainty regarding variable importance.  This may be due to the mix of subpopulations 
within the full sample. For this reason, we focused on the stratified subgroup models below 
which resulted in more interpretable findings.     
Higher cognitive ability. The best predictive model of expert disagreement for the higher 
cognitive ability group included complexity (beta = .21, 95% CI = .05, .37), randomness (beta = 
.18, 95% CI = .05, .32), and expert bias (beta = .20, 95% CI = .05, .36) as unique, significant 
predictors (Adjusted R2 = .46, BIC = –58.30). Higher levels of perceived expert disagreement 
were associated with higher perceived complexity and randomness in the domain and higher 
perceived expert bias due to ideology and/or private interests. The BIC difference between this 
model and the next best model (with complexity, bias, and expert knowledge as predictors) was 
1.9, suggesting very close to positive evidence for the superiority of the best model. Figure 1 
shows the model-averaged importance of terms. The bar graph shows the estimated importance 
of each predictor as the summed IC weight from all models in which the term appears.  Values 
closer to 1.0 indicate more importance or weight for a predictor. 
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Lower cognitive ability. The best predictive model of perceived expert disagreement for 
the lower cognitive ability group included only expert credibility/competence (beta = –.35, 95% 
CI = –.61, –.10; Adjusted R2 = .11, BIC = –10.02). Higher perceived expert disagreement was 
associated with lower belief in expert credibility/competence. The BIC difference between this 
model and the next best model was 2.20 (positive evidence for the superiority of the best model; 
see Figure 1).  
Higher self-reported knowledge in forecast domain. The best predictive model of expert 
disagreement for the higher self-reported knowledge in forecast domain group included only 
expert bias as a significant predictor (beta = .37, 95% CI = .20, .54; Adjusted R2 = .25, BIC = –
59.64). Higher levels of perceived expert disagreement were associated with higher perceived 
expert bias due to ideology and/or private interests. The BIC difference between this model and 
the next best model (with bias and randomness as predictors) was 1.8, suggesting very close to 
positive evidence for the superiority of the best model (see Figure 3).  
Lower self-reported knowledge in forecast domain. The best predictive model of expert 
disagreement for the lower self-reported knowledge in forecast domain group included only 
expert credibility/competence as a significant predictor (beta = –.41, 95% CI = –.61, –.19; 
Adjusted R2 = .20, BIC = –30.05). As with those of lower cognitive ability (above), higher 
perceived expert disagreement was associated with lower belief in expert credibility/competence. 
There were two models with a BIC difference of ~1.0 from this best model. The first model 
included expert knowledge as a predictor in addition to expert credibility/competence and the 
second included randomness in addition to expert credibility/competence. This suggests that we 
have only weak evidence for the superiority of the best model, although expert 
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credibility/competence is the strongest predictor in each of these alternative models (see Figure 
4).   
Discussion 
Our results suggest that most members of the public will attribute expert disputes to 
expert incompetence and/or expert bias and self-interest. Expert incompetence was the strongest 
predictor of perceived expert disagreement for participants with less education/cognitive ability 
and those that self-reported having little to no knowledge about a forecasting domain. These 
results are in contrast to earlier, mostly interview, studies that found the lack-of-scientific-
knowledge attribution to be the leading explanation for expert disagreement among participants 
with lower education levels.      
Contrary to expectations, participants who reported having moderate to high general 
knowledge about a domain were not more likely to attribute expert disagreement to natural 
(aleatory) causes (irreducible complexity and randomness). The strongest predictor was expert 
bias or self-interest. Only the more educated/high cognitive ability group attributed expert 
disagreement to irreducible complexity and randomness, although expert bias was still a strong 
predictor for this group as well. This differed from the Finnish results (Kajanne & Pirttilä-
Backman, 1999), in which the more educated stressed the bias explanation for expert disputes on 
food additives. 
There are several potential reasons for the divergence of results between our study and 
previous studies on this topic.  The first is that the psychometric approach is a more indirect and 
expressly quantitative method for examining the relations between public perceptions. Unlike 
interview and direct survey questions, the participants were not aware of the goals of this study, 
making it less likely that they would respond in a socially desirable way or that they would 
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respond affirmatively to all possible causes even when in doubt. We see this as a strength of our 
study and a good complement to prior work that used more direct questions. However, because 
the current analyses are all correlational, we cannot determine the direction of the causal arrow.  
Additional experimental work should be conducted to follow up on this and prior results.  
A second potential reason for divergence from prior results is the broad range of topics 
we examined using this approach. Previous research focused on specific topics (e.g., risks of 
food additives), potentially limiting the generalizability of the results. Third, we focus 
specifically on expert forecasting at varying time horizons, as opposed to statements about 
disputed facts (e.g., food additives cause cancer). Members of the public may have 
fundamentally different perceptions of whether or how experts answer what-will-happen 
questions as compared to what-is questions. 
Implications. From a theoretical perspective, these findings suggest that it may be useful 
to explore the role of a positivist view of science (e.g., Steel, List, Lach and Shindler, 2004; 
Rabinovich & Morton, 2012) in the response to expert disputes, particularly among those with 
lower education, cognitive ability and self-reported knowledge. For this group of participants, 
attribution of expert disputes to expert incompetence may be the result of a belief that science is 
objective and certain, and therefore, any disagreement must be an indication of faulty experts.  
The attribution of expert disputes to bias—a strong explanation for those who see 
themselves as having moderate to high knowledge of the topic, and somewhat less so for the 
high education/cognitive ability group—implies a more sophisticated view of science as being 
socially constructed and thus (for better or worse) subject to influence from financial or 
ideological interests. However, it is unclear from these results whether this viewpoint implies a 
crude, deliberate skewing of forecasts to fit one’s biases, or a more subtle model of the bias in 
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expert forecasts. Further research is again needed to identify and understand the importance of 
relevant moderators. For example, given that the two factors are not correlated, perhaps those 
who believe themselves to be knowledgeable are more prone to believe in deliberate bias in 
scientific estimates, while those with high cognitive ability might be more prone to believe in 
unconscious bias.  
Only the most educated, cognitively able people in our sample selected irreducible 
complexity and randomness of the topic area as an explanation for expert disputes, outweighing 
even their co-attribution to expert bias. As this is an explanation also used by scholars and 
experts themselves (see Introduction), it is tempting to attribute this judgment to this group 
having the most sophisticated view of science and expertise generally. We do not dispute this 
interpretation, but note that such sophistication need not rule out other attributions: besides the 
co-attribution to expert bias found here, we observe that scientists such as gravitation wave 
physicists use a diverse set of both crude (e.g., nationality) and subtle cues to judge the 
credibility of other researchers in their field (e.g., Collins & Evans, 2007, pp. 50–51, note 10). 
Research to assess whether lay attributions for expert disputes over forecasts are similar to their 
attributions for expert disputes over descriptions of current conditions or causal relationships also 
is needed. Such convergence seems likely but data to confirm that hypothesis are warranted. 
As for practical implications, under a deficit model of public understanding of science 
(e.g., Wynne, 1991) the findings that most people underweight the role of complexity and 
randomness in making predictions, and that even relatively sophisticated lay observers favor a 
bias explanation for expert disputes, will foster suggestions for communication and education 
strategies to counteract these perceptions. For example, one potential strategy would be to embed 
simple epistemological education within communications to reinforce concepts like randomness, 
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complexity and limitations in our ability to know. The findings may suggest a need for audience 
segmentation—i.e., use of different interventions for different segments of lay society—but 
otherwise do not alter the deficit-based interpretation. 
A more “public engagement”-focused model would suggest interactions between experts 
and laypeople to broaden the range of explanations both “upward” and “downward” in 
sophistication, rather than emphasize only the natural explanations. For example, the less-
educated might learn to conceive of positivist science as characterizing (at most) “settled 
science” and add the notion of bias to their repertoire, while the highly (self)-knowledgeable 
might add irreducible complexity and randomness to their repertoire without abandoning the bias 
attribution. Experts might learn to think of bias as an at least plausible explanation for expert 
disputes beyond “it explains my opponents’ positions,” and thus not an unwarranted stance for 
laypeople to take when observing expert disputes. 
Regardless of which, if either, “educational” model is pursued, a larger question for the 
public is how to assess the credibility of contending scientists. This study has identified a range 
of lay attributions as to when and why experts might disagree over forecasts in diverse fields, but 
whether and how these beliefs affect which of the disputing parties seems most credible is yet to 
be studied systematically. It is likely that diverse cues to credibility will be deployed (Collins & 
Evans, 2007), but neither their relative use nor potential moderators (e.g., cognitive ability) of 
such use have been examined.  
Conclusion. Multiple difficulties face the lay public in trying to evaluate or engage with 
uncertain information about the state of the world or forecasted events and actions. Unlike the 
relatively straightforward questions about how people might interpret or use ranges of risk 
estimates or forecasts to make choices (Dieckmann, Slovic, & Peters, 2009; Dieckmann, Peters, 
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Gregory, & Tusler, 2012), understanding expert disputes or even divergences in forecasts poses 
several serious challenges.  Is this dispute relevant to my life? Who am I to believe? What does it 
mean, to me and/or to society, that consensus cannot be reached on this topic? Our study shows, 
across a diverse set of domains, that laypeople tend to use coherent—albeit overly narrow—
attributions to make sense of why expert disputes occur and that these explanations are likely to 
vary predictably across different segments of the population. Further research can expand our 
understanding of how people cope with the challenges posed by such disputes, the implications 
of their responses for risk managers, and the degree to which public explanations, credibility 
cues, and other interpretations of disputes serve to enhance or hinder relations between science 
and society. 
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Table 1 
Possible Inferences of the Lay Public About Expert Disagreements 
Causal Inference Description: Experts disagree because . . . 
  1. Too much complexity in domain . . . making predictions is very difficult in 
complex, chaotic systems with a large number 
of diverse interrelated components. 
  2. Too much randomness in domain . . . making predictions is very difficult in 
domains where events have a lot of 
fundamental unpredictability or “randomness”.  
  3. Experts lack knowledge . . . they have not yet acquired enough scientific 
knowledge about the causes of the event. 
  4. Experts are incompetent . . . they are incompetent and are not really 
“experts” at all. 
  5. Experts are biased . . . one or more experts are intentionally or 
unintentionally biasing their conclusions due to 
ideology, worldviews, or private interests.   
  6. Experts are unwilling to admit 
uncertainty 
. . . they are not willing to admit uncertainty and 
are providing simplistic overly precise 
forecasts. 
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Figure 1. Model averaged importance of predictors in each subgroup model. 
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Appendix A. Forecasts  
HEALTH 
1.The number of confirmed human cases of bird influenza 6 months from now. 
2.Whether the cost of U.S. health care per person will be lower 6 months from now. 
3.Whether the world ranking of the U.S. with respect to life expectancy will be lower 5 years 
from now. 
4.The number of adults in the United States who will be clinically obese 5 years from now. 
5.Whether heart disease will still be the leading cause of death 15 years from now. 
6.The suicide rate in the U.S. 15 years from now.  
7.Whether there will be a cure for most types of cancer 50 years from now.  
8.The relative world ranking with regards to public health of the U.S. 50 years from now. 
 
POLITICS 
1.Whether Immigration laws in the U.S. will be revised significantly within the next 6 months. 
2.The likelihood that the Republican party will change its primary election rules to exclude Tea 
Party candidates in the next 6 months. 
3.Whether the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) will still be law 5 years from now. 
4.The number of U.S. states that will permit concealed handgun carry in 5 years. 
5.Whether Puerto Rico will become a U.S. state within the next 15 years. 
6.The percentage of eligible Americans who vote in the Presidential elections 15 years from 
now. 
7.Whether Israel will cease to exist as a separate country within the next 50 years. 
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8.The number of countries in the world that will have democratic governments 50 years from 
now. 
 
TERRORISM  
1.Whether terrorists will succeed in downing a commercial airliner in the next 6 months. 
2.The number of terrorist bombings in Afghanistan in the next 6 months.  
3.Whether Israel will launch a military assault against terrorist cells in Syria in the next 5 years. 
4.The number of people living in refugee camps in Somalia 5 years from now.  
5.Whether terrorists will succeed in poisoning a drinking water reservoir in the United States in 
the next 15 years. 
6.The annual number of deaths worldwide due to terrorist attacks 15 years from now.   
7.Whether there will be fewer international terrorist events 50 years from now. 
8.The proportion of the U.S. budget directed toward homeland security 50 years from now. 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
1.Whether progress will be made on an agreement to reduce total carbon emissions across the 
globe within the next 6 months.   
2.The percentage of U.S. ski resorts forced to close over the next 6 months due to lower 
snowfalls and higher winter temperatures. 
3.Whether there will be an increase in the number of extreme weather events 5 years from now. 
4.The number of deaths in the U.S. from heat stroke in 5 years. 
5.Whether climate change will improve U.S. economic growth in 15 years. 
6.The average sea level rise along U.S. coasts 15 years from now. 
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7.Whether the city of Miami, Florida will disappear entirely under water within 50 years. 
8.The percentage of current animal species that will become extinct due to climate change within 
50 years. 
 
ECONOMICS 
Predicting … 
1.Whether sales in the U.S. housing market will be higher 6 months from now.    
2.The U.S. unemployment rate 6 months from now. 
3.Whether the value of the Dow Jones stock market index will be above 20,000 5 years from 
now.  
4.The average mortgage interest rate in the U.S. in 5 years.  
5.Whether Microsoft will overtake Apple in sales of tablets and smartphones in 15 years. 
6.The ratio of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of India to that of the United States in 15 
years. 
7.Whether China will have a higher standard of living, measured as average yearly income, than 
Canada 50 years from now. 
8.The percentage change in the energy efficiency (Gross Domestic Product [GDP] divided by 
total energy use) of the U.S. in 50 years.    
 
CRIME 
Predicting … 
1.Whether “stop-and-frisk” policing will still be legal in New York City 6 months from now. 
2.The average number of bicycle thefts in a major metropolitan city 6 months from now.    
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3.Whether the use of hand-held cell phones while driving will be banned in all states 5 years 
from now.   
4.The average annual number of murders in the United States in 5 years. 
5.Whether drug-related murders in Mexico will be lower in 15 years. 
6.The number of U.S. states that will have legalized marijuana in 15 years. 
7.Whether the U.S. demand for illegal drugs will be lower 50 years from now. 
8.The violent crime rate (per 1000 citizens) in the U.S. 50 years from now.  
 
ENVIRONMENT 
Predicting… 
1.Whether laws protecting endangered species in the United States will be significantly 
weakened by Congress within the next 6 months.  
2.The percentage of total U.S. energy supplied by natural gas produced by fracking in 6 months.     
3.Whether removing dams from the Columbia River will result in larger salmon populations 5 
years from now. 
4.The total amount of money spent by businesses to comply with the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s enforcement of stream protection regulations in 5 years.    
5.Whether tough laws to halt cutting of the Amazonian rainforest will be passed within the next 
15 years. 
6.China’s overall levels of air pollution 15 years from now. 
7.Whether the Bengal tiger will become extinct in the next 50 years.  
8.The number of Bison (American buffalo) present on the western prairies 50 years from now. 
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Appendix B. Study Measures 
Construct Item Scale 
Expert disagreement How often do you think experts disagree about the 
causes of each of these events?  
1 = very rare–
5 = very 
frequent 
 How often do you think experts disagree about what 
methods should be used to forecast each of these 
events?  
1 = very rare–
5 = very 
frequent 
 How often do you think experts disagree about how 
to interpret the results from forecasts? 
1 = very rare–
5 = very 
frequent 
    Complexity How much complexity do you think there is in the 
processes that generate each of these events?  A 
more complex system is one with a large number of 
diverse interrelated components that exhibits 
behavior that cannot be predicted by just looking at 
the individual components. 
1 = very 
little– 
5 = A lot 
    Randomness How much randomness do you think there is in the 
processes that generate each of these events? A 
system with more “randomness” is one that is more 
fundamentally unpredictable by its very nature. This 
fundamental unpredictability cannot be reduced by 
gaining more knowledge about how the system 
works. 
1 = very 
little– 
5 = A lot 
Expert knowledge How much do you think experts understand about 
the causes of each of these events? 
1 = very 
poor– 
5 = very good 
 How much do you think experts know about the 
interactions among all of the factors that contribute 
to making each of these events occur?  
1 = very 
poor– 
5 = very good 
Credibility/competence How credible do you think the experts are that 
typically make these types of forecasts?  
1 = not at all–
5 = very 
credible 
 How competent do you think the experts are that 
typically make these types of forecasts?  
1 = not at all–
5 = very 
competent 
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Construct Item Scale 
Willing to admit 
uncertainty 
To what extent do you think that the experts that 
typically make these types of forecasts are willing to 
admit uncertainty?  
1 = not 
willing– 
5 = very 
willing 
 To what extent do you think that the experts that 
typically make these types of forecasts are willing to 
admit lack of knowledge?  
1 = not 
willing– 
5 = very 
willing 
Bias To what extent do you think that the experts that 
typically make these types of forecasts are affected 
by private interests?  
1 = not 
affected– 
5 = very 
affected 
 To what extent do you think that the experts that 
typically make these types of forecasts are affected 
by their own ideology and beliefs?  
1 = not 
affected– 
5 = very 
affected 
Self-reported knowledge How much general knowledge do you have about 
each of these fields? 
1 = very 
little– 
5 = A lot 
 
